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Introduction

Those shaping American foreign policy are said to take account of prevailing attitudes held by significant sectors of the electorate. Initially, it is asserted, policy is responsive to elite attitudes and ultimately to those of the general electorate itself.

If this is true, then attitudes toward policy problems must to some extent have a character independent of such stable political factors as partisanship, socioeconomic status, and the like. To the extent that policy predispositions are not independent of party preference and related political factors, they are automatically taken into ac-

count in traditional electoral appeals and are less worrisome to (and thereby less constraining on) those central to the policy process.

The focus of this study was on the differences in patterns of belief and opinion among persons advocating differing policies for coping with a specific international problem. What were sought were indications of the relationship between policy preference and other attitudes independent of stable political factors.

United States policy toward Cuba was selected, as our substantive focus, for a number of reasons: Cuban-American relations have been a recurrent issue in American political campaigns. During the past six years continuing problems have flared into two major crises—the “Bay of Pigs” invasion of April 1961 and the “missile crisis” of October 1962. From the point of view of the Kennedy Administration, the outcome of the 1962 confrontation was generally regarded as a success; the preceding crisis was judged a failure. Cuba, unlike other areas of conflict in the Cold War, is geographically close and considered a threat to a region in which the United States has long been influential. The combination of proximity and perceived threat has raised Cuba’s salience in the eyes of the American people and their political leaders. Since 1959 United States policy toward Cuba has

¹ Many social scientists collaborated in gathering the data and in the initial steps of data analysis for this study. In particular, we thank Walter Raine and Gerhart Sommers for their participation in the original design of the study and construction of the questionnaire. Numerous other persons helped through the Committee for the Application of the Behavioral Sciences to the Strategies of Peace (ABSSOP), and the Scientists on Issues of War and Peace. Financial assistance was received from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). While these contributors are not responsible for the content of this paper, we are deeply grateful for their participation, without which this study would have been impossible.

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shifted from giving economic aid to Castro's regime to the active support of an invasion by Cuban exile forces. The prominence of Cuba as a problem has not produced unanimity among Americans on what our policy toward the present Cuban regime should be; rather, support has crystallized for a variety of alternatives.

In the light of these general considerations, our study is focused on a number of questions. (1) What are the alternative policy postures? (2) What is the distribution of preferences for these alternatives? (3) To what extent are preferences for policy related to stable political factors? (4) What other factors increase our ability to explain policy preference?

An elite rather than a general sample was chosen because of the greater likelihood that beliefs about foreign policy would be informed and crystallized for such a group, allowing analysis of the possible complexities of policy preference. Local political leaders, members of state and county central committees of the Democratic and Republican parties, were chosen as particularly suitable because of their active participation in the political process, the likelihood that they would see themselves as influential in forming public opinion, and for their possible role as a strategic audience in foreign policy decision-making. The sample was drawn from five major counties in three western states. The state and county central committees form the official permanent state organization for the Democratic and Republican parties. In California, where most of the data were collected, the state central committee for each party consists of federal and state elected office-holders, the nominees for such offices, appointees of the party's nominees, and the chairmen of the county central committees. Some of the members of the county central committee are directly elected in party primaries.

Other members of the county political organization are incumbents in, or nominees for, the state legislature.

Data were collected in three California counties—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara (a largely metropolitan area 40 miles south of San Francisco); in Boulder, Colorado; and in Seattle, Washington.

The questionnaires were mailed in the first week of June 1963; respondents received a letter and telephone call to encourage active participation. Although steps were taken to assure anonymity, fear of the inadequacy of the precautions was still a frequently mentioned reason for nonparticipation. The return rate overall was 40 percent; 43 percent Republican and 38 percent Democratic response yielded a sample of 102 Republicans and 123 Democrats.⁸

Attempts made to assay the difference between respondents and nonrespondents by conversation with the leaders of the state central committees in California, and through questionnaires to the county committee members attending one meeting in San Francisco, indicated that the sample was biased toward the more active, influential members of each party. The questionnaire was self-administered, and consisted of a few open-ended items and many yes-no and multiple-choice items. Over 150 questions, requiring typically 35 minutes in all to complete, covered the following item domains:

(1) The perceived aim(s) of US policy toward Cuba and the likelihood of their being achieved. (2) The respondent's own

⁸ In each county the questionnaire was either mailed to all of the members (San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Boulder) or to a random sample of the members (Los Angeles and Kings County) of the county and state committees living in that county. The response rate did not differ significantly either between counties or between parties within counties.

preferred policy toward Cuba, and the likelihood that his policy would be enacted. (3) Attitude toward other federal policies concerning: civil defense, Defense Department appropriations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency appropriations. (4) The October 1962 missile crisis and the military threat posed by Cuba at that time. (5) Attitudes about the likelihood and effect of a nuclear war. (6) Comparative attitudes toward 10 world political leaders, determined by ratings of each leader on 6 scales: good-bad, strong-weak, response to friendly act, response to hostile act, difficulty in negotiation, dangerousness. (7) Standard demographic questions.

Table 1 reports the income, education, and felt political efficacy of the respondents. The sample was high-status, well-educated, and reported high felt political efficacy. The average income was greater than \$15,000; half had attended graduate or professional school; three-fourths felt that what they do affects public opinion. A measure of current events information indicated that the respondents were uniformly well-informed about Cuba. Political efficacy, information level, and economic and educational level, while often useful in explaining foreign policy attitudes in the general population, provided us with little leverage in understanding the foreign policy preferences of our sample of political leaders. Within the two parties we found no meaningful relationship between foreign policy preference toward Cuba and education or annual income. In addition, within the two parties, there was no difference in the policy preferences of those who were "status inconsistent" (i.e., respondents whose educational attainment was not congruent with their economic status) and those who were classified as "status consistent."

Previous research (McClosky *et al.*, 1960) has shown that the polarization of opinion

TABLE 1
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

	DEMO- CRATS		REPUB- LICANS	
	%	N	%	N
FAMILY INCOME				
Less than \$10,000	25	30	28	27
\$10,000-\$15,000	28	34	22	22
Greater than \$15,000	47	57	50	49
No information		2		4
	100	123	100	102
EDUCATION				
High school or less	15	19	19	19
College	22	27	42	43
Graduate or profes- sional school	63	77	39	40
	100	123	100	102
EFFICACY: "Do you think that what you do has any effect on public opinion?"				
Yes	76	93	77	75
No	24	30	23	23
No answer		0		4
	100	123	100	102

between the leadership of the two parties is substantial and is greater than that found in the general electorate. In this sample of political leaders we also found substantial partisan polarizations. Our intent, however, was not simply to study such differences between the parties, but instead to attempt to differentiate subgroups within each party on the basis of the specific policies they advocated toward Cuba, and then to examine how these preferred policies related to other issues and attitudes. After (I) establishing a policy preference index, this paper discusses (II) the correlates of policy preference and their interaction within and between parties, and (III) divergent policy groups within each party and the probable sources of this divergence.

1. The Policy Preference Index

To elicit opinions as to what specific policy the United States should adopt to-

TABLE 2
CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICY PREFERENCE INDEX FROM THE RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUAL POLICY QUESTIONS

POLICY PREFERENCE INDEX CLASSIFICATION ^a	INDIVIDUAL POLICY QUESTIONS			
	US troops and exiles invade Cuba ^b	Exiles only invade Cuba ^c	Further economic sanctions ^d	Economic aid to Cuba ^e
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	yes	no	yes or no	no
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	no	yes	yes or no	no
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	no	no	yes	no
4. Conciliatory status quo	no	no	no	no
5. Economic aid to Cuba	no	no	no	yes

^a Read horizontally across the table for the responses to the individual items required to place the respondent in a given policy preference classification.

^b "Do you think the United States should send its own soldiers along with Cuban exiles to invade and overthrow Castro?"

^c "Do you think the United States should help the Cuban exiles invade but not send any US soldiers into Cuba?"

^d "Do you think the United States should take further economic steps against Cuba?"

^e "Do you think the United States should take steps to help Cuba economically?"

ward Cuba, four policy alternatives were offered: (1) an invasion of Cuba with United States troops and exiles, (2) invasion with exiles only, (3) further economic sanctions against Cuba, and (4) economic aid to Cuba. Table 2 shows the five-step policy preference index constructed from these policy alternatives.⁷ Four of the 225 respondents were discarded from further analysis because they were inconsistent in their choices among policy alternatives.

The respondents were about equally divided among the five policy preference index steps.⁸ It is interesting to note that

⁷ Policy preference 4 respondents did not agree with any of the policy alternatives offered them. They (19 out of our sample of 225) are best characterized as wanting to maintain the status quo with regard to Cuba with the possibility of a more conciliatory policy being preferred—they do not want further punitive measures against Cuba. We assume that they logically fall somewhere between policy preferences 3 and 5. This assumption is generally borne out by the data.

⁸ The problem of attaching relatively value-free names to the policy preference dimension is a formidable one. Standard usage seems to be a "hard" to "soft" ordering, or (as arose within the Administration during the missile

on the one item in our policy preference index that has also appeared in surveys of population samples—"Should American troops be used in an invasion of Cuba?"—our elite respondents differ very little from the public at large. As a comparison of our data with results from several Gallup polls (Table 3) indicates, these party leaders differ from the public primarily on the extent to which they are willing to express an opinion.

We have, of course, only a limited basis for speculating about the relationship between the distribution of responses of the five-county leaders and the general population on the other policy items (the population data are not available). A more interesting question (which we cannot answer)

crisis) a "hawk" to "dove" dimension. Other possible aviary examples might be an "eagle" to "chicken" or a "vulture" to "owl" ordering. Although not completely free of the problem of making an evaluation of a position by the label, the least objectionable terminology for convenience of reference is a belligerent-conciliatory dichotomy. When we describe one group as more belligerent than another or as more conciliatory, we have no intention of imparting a judgment on that group.

TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERSHIP AND
GENERAL POPULATION OPINION ON THE IN-
VASION OF CUBA WITH AMERICAN FORCES

American troops should be used	Five- county leader study 8/63	AIPO ^a 2/27 1963	AIPO 10/17 1962	AIPO 5/7 1961
% "yes"	25	20	24	24
% "no"	73	64	63	65
% "dk"	2	16	13	11
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

^a Data drawn from published reports of the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) reported by Deutsch and Merritt (1965, p. 147).

would involve the cross-tabulation of policy opinion with party identification in the general public: would the distribution of policy preferences for party identifiers among the general public resemble that which we found for party leaders? Or would the Republicans among the general public respond like the Democratic leaders in conformity with McClosky's (1960) hypothesis? There is no question, however, that party identification produced large differences among our respondents on the preference index: 46 percent of the Republicans preferred policy 1 (invasion of Cuba with United States troops) and only 10 percent of the Democrats chose this alternative. At the

other end of the index, about half of the Democrats preferred either policy 4 or policy 5 (to maintain a conciliatory *status quo* or to give economic aid to Cuba); only two of the 101 Republicans chose either of these alternatives (Table 4).⁹ These data lead to the inescapable conclusion that party identification is the *single* most important factor predicting policy preference, but it is also apparent that partisanship is not strong enough to preclude substantial diversity within the ranks of local party leaders.

Approval of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation was related both to political party identification and to policy preference (Table 5). No Republican policy preference group approved Kennedy's actions as much as any Democratic policy group. But the closer the policy preference was to the policy of the Kennedy Administration, the more likely was approval of

⁹ The data from all five of the counties in our study were combined in the tables in this paper. The findings were, however, generally consistent across all counties. Since the five counties were not randomly selected and since the study was designed to be exploratory and suggestive rather than to test explicit hypotheses, significance levels are not reported.

TABLE 4
PARTY AND POLICY PREFERENCE

Policy preference	DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS		% Democrats in each policy group
	%	N	%	N	
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	9	11	46	46	19%
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	17	20	40	40	33%
3. Further economic sanctions	27	32	13	13	71%
4. Conciliatory status quo	14	17	2	2 ^a	89%
5. Economic aid to Cuba	33	40	0	0	100%
	100	120	100	101	

^a In tables presenting the policy preference index against party in the rest of the paper, policy preferences 4 and 5 for the Republicans will be omitted because of the small number of cases. Tables will not include nonresponses since only a few respondents failed to answer any given question and nonresponse does not affect the findings.

TABLE 5
APPROVAL OF KENNEDY HANDLING OF CUBAN
SITUATION IN RELATION TO PARTY AND POLICY
PREFERENCE

Policy preference ^a	PROPORTION APPROVING OF KENNEDY'S HANDLING OF CUBAN SITUATION ^b	
	Democrats	Republicans
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	64%	2%
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	85%	16%
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	94%	58%
4. Conciliatory status quo	88%	.
5. Economic aid to Cuba	75%	.

^a Approximate N (percentage base) for each party-policy group is given in Table 3.

^b "Do you think President Kennedy handled the Cuban situation well?"

^c See note to Table 4.

Kennedy's actions, irrespective of party affiliation.¹⁰

A further question, asked of those who disapproved of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation, concerned the reason for their disapproval. The replies served to verify the distinctions drawn in the policy preference index. Regardless of party, the advocates of invasion who disapproved of Kennedy's policy gave as their reason that "he has not been forceful enough," while those who were opposed to invasion and disapproved of Kennedy's policy said that "he has been too aggressive."

Our examination of the relationship of stable political factors to policy preferences yields mixed results: while measures of socioeconomic status, information, and efficacy contribute little to our understanding of policy choices, party identification is a powerful variable. We can begin to appre-

¹⁰ The President's policy at the time of the study was policy preference 3, further economic sanctions. Earlier, in April 1961, policy preference 2, invasion with exiles, was United States policy.

ciate, with our examination of policy approval, the need to consider other factors in seeking to account for policy preference.

II. Issue-Specific Correlates of Policy Preference

Although we have substantially reaffirmed McClosky's finding on the importance of party in accounting for the issue orientation of political elites, we would also expect that an examination of specific aspects of the situation would increase our explanatory power.

A. CUBA AS A SITTING DUCK

Beliefs about whether there were still (i.e., nine months after the crisis) nuclear missiles in Cuba, about whether Cuba poses a serious threat to world peace, and about whether Russia or China would come to Cuba's aid if there were an invasion, were all related in a linear fashion to policy preference (Table 6). The three beliefs did not all have equal salience: the large majority of invasion advocates believed there were still missiles in Cuba, but many fewer felt that Cuba represented a serious threat to world peace. Thus, advocacy of invasion was not dependent upon perceiving Cuba as a serious threat so much as on the belief that there were missiles in Cuba which could be eliminated by invasion, and with few military costs. Thus Cuba was seen as a "sitting duck" which could be picked off with little risk of escalation into a war with Russia or China.

B. CONCERN OVER NUCLEAR WAR

In his speech on October 22, 1962, announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy said:

... it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United

TABLE 6
GAINS AND RISKS IN AN INVASION POLICY AND POLICY PREFERENCE

		POLICY PREFERENCE				
		Pro-invasion		Non-invasion		
		1	2	3	4	5
Do you think that Russia or China would come to Cuba's aid if Cuba were invaded by a force large enough to overthrow Castro?	% no					
Do you think that there are still nuclear missiles in Cuba?	% yes					
Do you think the Cuban situation is a serious threat to world peace at this time?	% yes					

States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union [N. Y. Times, 1962].

Not surprisingly, concern over nuclear war increased substantially during the Cuban crisis as it has in other periods of high international tension (Scott and Withey, 1958). Caplovitz (1964) reported on data from a panel study in two Illinois towns showing that in March 1962, 28 percent of his respondents were worried about the atom bomb or fallout; in late October 1962, shortly after Kennedy's speech, 65 percent of the previously interviewed respondents now reported worry about the atom bomb or fallout.

In our study we found significant relationships between policy preference and concern over nuclear war. Although other studies have indicated that there is little relationship between amount of concern over nuclear war and foreign policy attitudes in the *general electorate*,¹¹ we could expect

¹¹ This finding is based on a secondary analysis of data from a national probability sample generously provided by Stephen B. Withey, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. Responsibility for the analysis is ours. See also Modigliani (1963). However, Chesler and Schmuck (1964) report a positive relationship between feeling "scared" during the Cuban missile crisis and a conciliatory policy preference in a sample of students.

to find such a relationship between concern and attitudes of *political leaders*. Their relatively greater involvement in the political process would make international affairs more salient for them. They have a greater awareness of policy alternatives, a greater concern over present foreign policy, and greater sensitivity to the "proper" partisan position on these issues than has the general electorate (McClosky *et al.*, 1960). Further, it is reasonable to expect that as attitudes toward a problem become more salient (and subject to comparison with those of one's associates), beliefs would be organized into an internally consistent system.

The respondents' retrospective estimates of felt likelihood of open military conflict ensuing from the Cuban crisis, escalating into full-scale nuclear war, were significantly related to policy preference: the advocates of more conciliatory policies thought escalation more likely (Table 7).

In estimating their own chances of survival in the event of a large-scale nuclear war, respondents differed in the same direction. Those who preferred the toughest policies toward Cuba were least pessimistic about their chances of survival. While the relationship was quite strong across all policy preferences for the Democrats, it

TABLE 7
CONCERN OVER WAR AND POLICY PREFERENCE

		POLICY PREFERENCE				
		Pro-invasion		Non-invasion		
		1	2	3	4	5
If a war had broken out (during the first few days of the Cuban crisis), do you think it would have been a full-scale nuclear war? % yes	Democrats	27%	20%	41%	53%	49%
	Republicans	13%	18%	25%	—	—

was a weak one within the Republican group. This was due in part to the restricted variation in policy preference among Republicans. The relationship did, however, vary regularly; in other words, moving from belligerent policy preferences to more conciliatory preferences, the mean estimated probability of survival decreased (Table 8).

Thus, for this well-informed, politically active, and articulate group, pessimism about the likelihood of the occurrence of nuclear war and their own chance of survival in such an eventuality was associated with conciliatory policy preferences. While not wishing to minimize this finding, we may note that concern over likelihood of nuclear war can also be associated with advocacy of more belligerent policies. The logic of such a position would argue as follows: conciliation leads to appeasement and eventually to thermonuclear war; such a calamitous occurrence can be averted only by maintaining a "tough" policy. Therefore, we must be cautious about generalizing

from our findings. For our sample, however, advocates of belligerent policies are those who minimize the dangers of war, and advocates of conciliatory policies are those who fear its likelihood and consequences.

C. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT FUTURE CUBA POLICY AND OUTCOMES

Beliefs about the success of present United States policy were examined, as were expectations about the likelihood of adoption of the respondent's own preferred policy. The data presented a picture of political leaders who realistically assess as low the probability of adoption of policies sharply divergent from present US policies: the more deviant a policy alternative was from present policy, the smaller was its perceived likelihood of adoption (Table 9).

The data also produced an image of individuals generally pessimistic about the efficacy of *any* policy toward Cuba. While there was variation in whether or not each

TABLE 8
ESTIMATED CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK AND PARTY AND POLICY PREFERENCE

		POLICY PREFERENCE				
		Pro-invasion		Non-invasion		
		1	2	3	4	5
Mean estimated probability of survival in the event of a nuclear attack ^a	Democrats	54%	33%	26%	24%	12%
	Republicans	34%	32%	26%	—	—

^a "If there were a large-scale nuclear attack on the area in which you live, how do you rate your own chances of living through the attack? Choose a percent along the line and circle that percent."

TABLE 9
PROPORTION IN EACH PARTY-POLICY GROUP THAT FEEL THEIR PREFERRED POLICY WILL BE
ADOPTED^a

Policy preference	POLITICAL PARTY			
	Democrats		Republicans	
	%	N ^b	%	N ^b
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	20%	10	10%	30
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	76%	17	48%	31
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	70%	30	70%	10
4. Conciliatory status quo				
5. Economic aid to Cuba	10%	30		

^a Policy preference 4 (conciliatory status quo) respondents do not advocate a specific policy and are therefore excluded from this table.

^b Percentage base. The Ns on this item are reduced because some respondents felt that no specific policy that was listed was "likely" to occur. The exclusion of these respondents tends to reduce the differences between policy groups; thus the inclusion of these respondents as people who felt pessimistic about their policy ever being adopted would provide even stronger evidence for the interpretation of the table given in the text.

of the following was seen as a goal of United States policy, a majority felt that the United States would not succeed in achieving any of them: getting rid of Castro, loosening his ties with the Communist bloc, reestablishing a free enterprise system in Cuba, or similar policy goals. The one exception to this pessimistic tendency was the belief, chosen by the majority in both parties, that the United States would succeed in halting the spread of Castroism in Latin America.

The two polar groups—advocates of invading with United States troops and advocates of giving economic aid—were even more pronounced in their pessimism. Neither of these groups believed that the United States would succeed in curtailing Castro's influence; in this respect they dissented sharply from the single note of optimism sounded by the majority of their colleagues. The advocates of the two polar policies were thus doubly pessimistic; they saw little hope of their own preferred policy being adopted and little chance of the goals of present United States policy being realized. Small wonder that the advocates of the two extreme policies were among the most disapproving of President Kennedy's Cuba policy.

In summary, issue-specific factors add to the understanding of differences in policy preference by suggesting an underlying cost/gain calculus at work. Those preferring more conciliatory policies tended to emphasize the costs and dangers (in terms of personal hazard and/or risk of escalation) of alternative, more belligerent courses of action. Those opting for more belligerent alternatives saw little cost or risk attached to tougher policies; they tended to emphasize the threatening aspects of the existent situation and thus, presumably, the gains obtainable by forcefully reducing or removing the perceived threat. The items concerning possible changes in United States policy, policy objectives, and probable success in achieving objectives are of little help in explaining policy preference, since the pall of pessimism extends over all policy types. However, there is a curvilinear relationship such that both polar groups were doubly pessimistic—about outcomes of present United States policy and the likelihood that their own preferred policy would be adopted.

III. Correlates of Policy Preference not Specific to the Cuban Situation

To enhance our ability to account for

TABLE 10
OTHER POLICIES AND CUBA POLICY PREFERENCE

		CUBA POLICY PREFERENCE				
		Pro-invasion		Non-invasion		
		1	2	3	4	5
Are you in favor of increased support to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? % yes	Democrats	45%	80%	94%	94%	100%
	Republicans	17%	36%	67%	—	—
Are you in favor of increasing the defense budget to build up US military strength? % yes	Democrats	73%	70%	83%	25%	18%
	Republicans	67%	53%	60%	—	—
Are you in favor of federal funds to construct fallout shelters? % yes	Democrats	64%	40%	29%	29%	18%
	Republicans	35%	21%	45%	—	—

policy preference, we obtained information on two other clusters of items not specifically related to Cuba: (1) degree of support for federal expenditures on various programs related to defense and foreign policy, and (2) items relating to images of world leaders.

In the first cluster we queried attitudes toward the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency appropriation, the defense budget, and federal funds for fallout shelters. For both Democrats and Republicans, support for additional appropriations to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency increased in a linear fashion with advocacy of the more conciliatory policies. Support for additional appropriations to the Defense Department and for federal funds for fallout shelters *decreased* similarly although not as consistently, particularly in the case of the Republicans (Table 10). Here, as elsewhere, the fact that findings for certain of the intraparty policy types, including type 3 Republicans, are based on a small number of cases should be taken into account.

The fact that policy preference on matters not directly pertaining to Cuba was related to Cuba policy preference was in accord with the other results, which have shown that a variety of opinions and beliefs

were systematically related to advocacy of a policy alternative.

The second cluster of items was designed to measure respondents' perceptions of world political leaders on a number of dimensions. The aims and methods were based on investigations which have employed the Semantic Differential by Osgood, in particular a study reported by Suci (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957).¹²

While our study shared many of the interests underlying Suci's study, the methods employed differed somewhat. The only "concepts" judged here were world political leaders. Two sets of world political leaders

¹² Osgood's general methodology has entailed presenting numerous concepts to judges who rate each concept on a series of polar opposite adjectives (e.g., good-bad, strong-weak, fair-unfair). Factor analysis of the ratings in numerous experiments has revealed three factors which are interpreted as the framework of semantic space: evaluation, potency, and activity. In a study of the 1952 election Suci had three types of voter judge a number of politically relevant concepts (e.g., federal spending, use of the atom bomb, Estes Kefauver, Senator McCarthy) on ten scales from the semantic framework for their judgments, and found that this framework did not contain the usual three factors mentioned above, but only one factor which was called benevolent dynamism vs. malevolent insipidity.

TABLE 11
MEAN SCORES ON GOOD-BAD AND STRONG-WEAK FOR KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV BY PARTY AND POLICY PREFERENCE*

Party and policy preference	GOOD-BAD SCALE		STRONG-WEAK SCALE	
	Kennedy	Khrushchev	Kennedy	Khrushchev
Democrats				
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	2.36	5.18	2.73	2.36
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	1.55	4.35	1.65	2.42
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	1.67	4.13	1.80	2.81
4. Conciliatory status quo	2.06	4.13	2.00	1.87
5. Economic aid to Cuba	2.13	3.86	2.33	2.21
Republicans				
1. Invade Cuba with US troops	3.78	6.55	4.68	2.05
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	3.11	5.32	3.58	2.21
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	2.90	4.00	3.00	3.00

* A seven-point scale was used with the *most favorable* score possible (good on the good-bad scale and strong on the strong-weak scale) being equal to one and the *most unfavorable* score possible (bad and weak) being equal to seven. Most scores were some number between one and seven. The table entries are the arithmetic means for each group for Kennedy and Khrushchev on the two scales. The lower the mean, the more favorable the image; the higher the mean, the more unfavorable the image. A mean of 4.0 is at the middle point of the scale in an area of approximate neutrality.

were presented for judgment: (1) Batista, Castro, Eisenhower, Hitler, Kennedy, Khrushchev, Nixon, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Stevenson; (2) Adenauer, Castro, deGaulle, Khrushchev, Macmillan, Mao Tse-tung, Nehru, Tito, and U Thant. These two sets of leaders were judged on four scales labeled at each end as (a) returns a friendly act—exploits a friendly act, (b) gives in to a threatening act—gets tough or antagonistic when threatened¹³; and, from the Semantic Differential, (c) good-bad, and (d) strong-weak. The Group 2 leaders were also judged on two other scales: (a) not dangerous—extremely dangerous, and (b) least difficult to negotiate with—most difficult to negotiate with. Another deviation from the usual Semantic Differential procedure was that, instead of having the respondents judge each “concept” separately on all of the scales before judging another “concept,” the respondents were required to place the names of all the political leaders on a single

¹³ These two scales were devised on the basis of certain ideas about the reduction of international tension advanced by Osgood (1962).

scale and thus focus attention on making comparisons and differentiations among them on each dimension.

Only that part of the data which is directly relevant to the policy preference index is reported here. (Additional findings will be reported in a subsequent paper.) Judgments of Kennedy and Khrushchev are presented in Table 11.

In perceptions of Khrushchev, the range of judgments within each party and the difference in judgments between parties were far greater on the good-bad dimension than on the strong-weak dimension. For perceptions of Kennedy, the reverse pattern was found: there was a greater range of opinions within parties and greater differences between parties on the strong-weak than on the good-bad dimension. This might suggest that in viewing our own national leader the divisive issue was estimate of strength rather than of virtue; but in views of the leader of an opponent nation the divisive issue was virtue rather than strength.¹⁴

¹⁴ The findings on Kennedy and Khrushchev are open to the methodological criticism that,

TABLE 12
MEAN SCORES ON GOOD-BAD AND ON DANGEROUSNESS FOR OPPONENT LEADERS BY PARTY AND POLICY PREFERENCE*

Party and policy preference	GOOD-BAD SCALE				DANGEROUSNESS SCALE		
	Hitler	Stalin	Khrushchev	Castro	Mao	Khrushchev	Tito
Democrats							
1. Invade Cuba with US troops and exiles	6.54	5.45	5.18	6.27	6.36	5.54	4.18
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	5.83	6.06	4.35	6.23	6.70	6.00	3.55
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	6.74	6.12	4.13	5.58	6.78	5.70	3.65
4. Conciliatory status quo	6.06	5.60	4.13	5.29	6.41	5.17	3.87
5. Economic aid to Cuba	6.78	6.19	3.86	4.59	6.34	4.34	3.03
Republicans							
1. Invade Cuba with US troops	6.45	6.93	6.55	6.21	6.67	6.39	4.94
2. Invade Cuba with exiles only	6.18	5.76	5.32	6.27	6.67	6.35	4.44
3. Further economic sanctions against Cuba	6.45	6.27	4.00	5.90	6.58	5.61	4.36

* A seven-point scale was used with the most dangerous score possible being equal to seven and the least dangerous score possible being equal to one.

While the relationship for the Republican groups between policy preference and evaluation of Kennedy appears to have been linear, for the Democrats the relationship was more curvilinear. Those closest to the President's policy (preference group 3) judged him in a more favorable light in regard to virtue and strength than did policy preference groups which differed in either direction from the President's position.

Table 11 shows also that good-bad judgments of Khrushchev were related in a linear fashion to policy preference within both parties: the image of Khrushchev became less unfavorable moving from the belligerent policies to the conciliatory policies. This

conceivably, the procedure of having both figures rated simultaneously on the same scale prejudices the results. While we are not in agreement with such a criticism, further research would seem necessary to establish that the findings would hold with difference rating procedures, and also to validate the findings with another sample of respondents judging the new set of current world leaders.

relationship between policy preference and evaluation of an opponent nation's leader was found only for certain leaders; for other leaders, there was little variation among policy preference groups in the negative views of the leader.

Table 12 shows that judgments of Hitler and Stalin on the good-bad dimension, and of Mao on the dangerousness dimension, did not vary with policy preference; all policy preference groups agreed that these persons were bad or dangerous. Judgments of Khrushchev on good-bad and to a lesser extent on dangerousness, of Castro on good-bad, and of Tito on dangerousness, all varied in a linear fashion with policy preference. Generally, the more belligerent groups had a more unfavorable attitude towards Khrushchev, Castro, and Tito than the groups favoring more conciliatory policies. If we compare the two extreme policy groups, Democrats and Republicans favoring United States invasion versus Democrats favoring economic aid, the belligerent preference

TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF TWO MOST EXTREME POLICY PREFERENCE GROUPS: ADVOCATES OF INVASION OF CUBA WITH UNITED STATES TROOPS AND ADVOCATES OF ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA

Invasion with United States troops (N = 57)	Give economic aid to Cuba (N = 40)
81% are Republicans	100% are Democrats
86% think there are still nuclear missiles in Cuba	28% think there are still nuclear missiles in Cuba
11% think that Russia or China would aid Cuba in event of an invasion of Cuba	51% think that Russia or China would aid Cuba in event of an invasion of Cuba
45% think their chances of survival are better than 50-50 in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack	7% think their chances of survival are better than 50-50 in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack
25% thought that a war might start during the first few days of the Cuban crisis	60% thought that a war might start during the first few days of the Cuban crisis
30% think the majority of the Cuban people prefer Castro to Batista	90% think the majority of the Cuban people prefer Castro to Batista
46% feel that the United States is at least partly responsible for the bad relations between Cuba and the United States	97% feel that the United States is at least partly responsible for the bad relations between Cuba and the United States
23% want increased funds for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	100% want increased funds for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
19% thought the United Nations helped to avoid a war during the Cuban missile crisis	73% thought the United Nations helped to avoid a war during the Cuban missile crisis
68% think we should increase the defense budget	18% think we should increase the defense budget
13% think their policy will be adopted	10% think their policy will be adopted

groups see less difference among Hitler, Stalin, Khrushchev, Castro, Mao, and Tito than does the conciliatory group.

IV. Polar Policy Groups

Identifying those who favored United States invasion of Cuba or economic aid to Cuba as "polar" should not be taken as indicating that these individuals comprised a small portion of the sample. Ninety-seven respondents (43 percent of the sample) comprised these two groups. They were, also, demographically homogeneous with the total sample. The two groups, moreover, were not "extreme" in the sense of being "alienated" from the mainstream of American politics. The three best indicators of estrangement from the political system—low involvement and participation, self-identification as an "independent," and low felt political efficacy—were not characteris-

tics of these individuals; they held political office, were strong partisan identifiers, and saw themselves as highly efficacious.

The principal similarity between the two polar groups has been seen to be their pessimistic outlook on Cuba policy. What items distinguished them? Table 13 dramatically demonstrates the lines of divergence. The total "yes-no" quality of the list brings to mind a bickering debate.

Underlying this debate were, principally, questions of belief. Only two of the nine items are questions of value (funds for ACDA *should* be increased; the defense budget *should* be increased). The two polar groups differed in their guesses about the world, in their interpretations of reality: whether the Soviet Union would come to Cuba's aid, whether they would live through a nuclear attack, and so on.

In the most fundamental sense the two

polar groups can be said to operate within different frames of reference. The difference extended even to their perceptions of world leaders.

V. Party Identification and Policy-Associated Variables: Deviation from the Majority Within a Given Party

Although the Democrats generally supported the more conciliatory policies and the Republicans the more belligerent policies toward Cuba, there was some deviation from the majority within the two parties: some Republicans did not want to invade Cuba and some Democrats did. The policy preference index can be divided between *invade* (policy preferences 1 and 2) and *not invade* (policy preferences 3, 4, and 5) to form four groups: pro-invasion Democrats (N = 31), non-invasion Democrats (N = 89), pro-invasion Republicans (N = 85), and non-invasion Republicans (N = 15).

In order to investigate the unifying and divisive factors between the majority and minority policy groups in the two parties, an index of deviation was used to measure the degree to which the minority group within a party deviated from the majority of their party. The index for a given dichotomous response variable is equal to the range of deviation (percentage of difference between the majority and minority policy groups) *within* a party divided by the percentage of difference *between* the majority policy groups of the two parties.¹⁵ Calcula-

tion of the deviation index is illustrated for the following item: "Do you think President Kennedy handled the situation (all that happened with respect to Cuba up to now) well?" The percentage of favorable response within each group was

Pro-invasion Republicans	8.3%
Non-invasion Republicans	50.0%
Pro-invasion Democrats	77.4%
Non-invasion Democrats	84.3%

For the Republicans, the deviation index on this item was calculated to be

$$\frac{50.0 - 8.3}{84.3 - 8.3} = .55.$$

For the Democrats,

$$\frac{84.3 - 77.4}{84.3 - 8.3} = .09.$$

A large deviance score on an item for a given party indicates that the differing policy groups within that party also differed on that item; that is, the item tends to accentuate the differences between the policy groups in a party. In the example above, the percentage data indicate that the Republicans were more divided among themselves on their evaluation of President Kennedy's handling of Cuba than were the Democrats, and the larger deviance index score reflects that fact. Tables 14 and 15 show the deviation analysis variables ordered from minimum to maximum deviation for the two parties.

Two items are extremely high on the deviance index for both parties. The estimation of one's chances of living through

¹⁵ For some variables, the non-invasion Republicans are "more Democratic" in their attitudes than the non-invasion Democrats, and similarly the pro-invasion Democrats are "more Republican" than the pro-invasion Republicans. This results in a deviance score greater than unity. Only variables that are consistent, in the sense that the variable predicts policy in the same direction in both parties, are included. Thus, as on the policy dichotomy, the deviation

on a given variable by the minority of one party was toward the majority of the other party. Finally, variables had to have a range (difference between the maximum and minimum percentages for the four party-policy groups) of at least 25 percent to be included in the analysis. This last restriction was made so as to include only variables that were related to party and/or policy.

TABLE 14
DEVIATION INDEX SCORES FOR DEMOCRATS

Item	Deviation index score
Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation	.09
Castro pleased over the way things worked out	.31
Khrushchev pleased over the way things worked out	.36
Increased support to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	.41
Percent of Cuban people preferring Castro to the previous government	.50
Cuban situation a serious threat to world peace at this time	.50
Still nuclear missiles in Cuba	.70
If war, full-scale nuclear war	.74
Russia or China will come to Cuba's aid if Cuba is invaded	.85
Think United Nations helped avoid war during the Cuban crisis	.97
Own chances of living through local nuclear attack	1.20
Increasing defense budget	1.53

TABLE 15
DEVIATION INDEX SCORES FOR REPUBLICANS

Item	Deviation index score
If war, full-scale nuclear war	.19
Think United Nations helped avoid war during the Cuban crisis	.26
Increasing defense budget	.38
Percent of Cuban people preferring Castro to the previous government	.39
Still nuclear missiles in Cuba	.48
Kennedy's handling of the Cuban crisis	.55
Increased support to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	.64
Cuban situation a serious threat to world peace at this time	.71
Russia or China will come to Cuba's aid if Cuba is invaded	.94
Castro pleased over the way things worked out	1.08
Khrushchev pleased over the way things worked out	1.15
Own chances of living through local nuclear attack	1.53

a local nuclear attack produced the highest deviation score in the Republican party and the second highest score in the Democratic party: in both parties the pro-invasion groups were more optimistic about chances of survival. The other high deviation item (third highest for Republicans, fourth highest for Democrats) for both parties concerned whether or not Russia or China would come to the aid of Cuba if Cuba were invaded by a force large enough to overthrow Castro: in both parties, the pro-invasion groups were more likely to feel that an invasion would not escalate. These two items were discussed in an earlier section ("Cuba as a Sitting Duck").

McClosky and his associates (1960) report:

In computing scores for homogeneity we were in part concerned to test the belief that political parties develop greatest internal solidarity on those questions which most separate them from their opponents. According to this hypothesis,

external controversy has the effect of uniting the members further by confronting them with a common danger. Whether or not this hypothesis would be borne out in a study of small, sectarian parties we cannot say, but it receives no support from the present study of the American mass parties . . . there is no consistent relationship between inter-party conflict and intra-party cohesion.

Our data, analyzed in a different framework, are congruent with McClosky's findings. The items that produced large differences *between* parties are not correlated with items that produced small differences between differing policy groups *within* a party. The correlation between rank order interparty differences on the items in Tables 13 and 14 and the rank order differences between the pro-invasion and non-invasion policy groups in the Democratic party was $-.08$. The correlation between rank order interparty differences and the rank order differences between the pro-invasion and non-invasion Republicans was $.27$.

Within the Democratic party, the most powerful unifying factor for the divergent Cuba policy subgroups was the presence of a Democrat in the White House; favorable evaluations of President Kennedy and the issues associated with the Presidency were common to the differing policy subgroups. The first four minimum deviance variables for the Democratic party all centered on the President. The lowest deviance for the differing subgroups came on an evaluation of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation. The two next lowest deviance items dealt with ratings of how pleased the enemy leaders, Castro and Khrushchev, were over the Cuban situation; to regard Castro or Khrushchev as pleased with what had happened in Cuba would indicate a negative evaluation of the President's handling of the crisis. The association between a favorable evaluation of the President's handling of the Cuban situation and the belief that Khrushchev was displeased over what happened in Cuba was found in all groups in both parties. The fourth smallest deviance issue for the Democrats was support of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, again an issue associated with the President.¹⁶

Turning now to the Republicans, these same four items were highly divisive: they appear as the second, third, sixth, and seventh (of thirteen) *most divisive* items among the policy subgroups within the Republican party. (When the two items independent of party are removed, the first four minimum deviance items for the Democrats appear as the first, second, fourth, and fifth maximum deviance items for the Republicans.)

¹⁶ We can safely assume for our sample of political leaders, as cannot be assumed for a general electorate sample, that the respondents are aware of the public position of the President on issues.

Generally speaking, for the in-party leadership, divergent policy groups can agree on perceptions of the President and this may tend to limit other differences within the party; for the out-party leadership, the Presidency acts as a divisive influence and accentuates the differences between divergent policy groups. The limits of this generalization are difficult to ascertain; perhaps it applies only to foreign policy issues, or arises only where there is a call for unification behind the President which might attract some support from out-party leadership; or it may reflect the proximity of a Presidential election, or the organizational and ideological splintering of the leadership in the California Republican Party.

Summary and Conclusions

Plainly, there was little consensus on policy toward Cuba among our group of state and county political leaders. As has been mentioned, this diversity of opinion was expected, since actual United States policy toward Cuba has varied during the last few years and differs from United States policy toward other Western countries. Two of the objectives of this study were (a) to try to increase our understanding of what accounts for differences in preferred policy on an issue where there is crystallized divergence, and (b) to explore particularly those correlates of policy preference that might be expected to change, whether spontaneously or through planned influence, and thus have an effect on policy preferences.

What to do about Cuba appears to be a spectacularly divisive question, more so among Democrats than Republicans, but enough so in both groups as to cause headaches to national leaders desiring intraparty consensus, and worse to those who desire bipartisan consensus. We have no reason to believe that our sample is unrepresentative in the sense of being more divergent

in their views on Cuba than local political leaders in other parts of the country. In speaking of divisiveness, we are not referring merely to range of opinion but also to distribution of opinion over the range: 25 percent of the total sample advocated invasion of Cuba with United States troops; 18 percent advocated economic aid to Cuba.

These large differences of opinion as to how to cope with the Cuban situation are associated with pessimism as to eventual outcomes. We would expect those who advocate policies different from the one currently being implemented to be pessimistic about the outcome of the current policy. But the pessimism found in our sample goes far beyond this common-sense expectation. Those who advocate divergent policies not only think that United States aims will not be advanced through current policy, but also think there is very little chance of their preferred policy alternatives being implemented. There is a tendency for those who want more conciliatory policies to think that any change is more likely to be in the direction of more belligerent policies, and for those who want tougher policies to believe that change will be in the direction of more conciliatory moves.

Even more surprising was the extent of pessimism among those who tend to agree with the policy in effect; for the most part, they are as pessimistic as everyone else in estimating the likelihood of achieving what they considered to be United States objectives. The only apparent ray of optimism concerned the chances of preventing the spread of Castroism; approximately 60 percent of the Democrats thought this was an aim that would be achieved, and approximately 40 percent of the Republicans. (On this item, those most in agreement with current policy were slightly more optimistic than the average.)

One of the reasons for working with a

sample that was informed, articulate, and concerned about foreign policy was the expectation that in such a sample policy preferences would be differentiated and also would be coherently integrated in a larger, more complex pattern of beliefs and attitudes. This was indeed the case: we found that a variety of beliefs and attitudes are related to policy preference and, even though party identification is the best predictor of policy preference, most of these correlates are "nonpartisan" in the sense that they are correlated with the policy preference index within both parties.

Policy preferences can be viewed as the product of a particular set of values and a particular analytic framework, although either the values or the analysis or both may remain implicit in any particular policy recommendation. Therefore, for policy preferences to change, either values or analyses have to change. We assume the latter are more subject to change, particularly for people who have to support their policy choices in interaction with intelligent, informed associates.

By assuming that cognitive beliefs and analyses are more subject to change, we are by no means assuming that they are easily changed. On examining the correlates of policy preference, one finds that, although a large number of them are cognitive in nature, *none* of them is subject to unequivocal confirmation or disconfirmation. Of course, this is a function of the items included in the questionnaire in the first place, but on the other hand it is precisely those items that are amenable to varying interpretations that one would expect to relate to policy.

The cognitive beliefs related to policy preference in this study can be divided into three categories in terms of whether they refer to the present, the future, or the past. For those questions that deal with the pres-

ent—for instance, whether there are still nuclear missiles in Cuba; whether Cubans prefer Castro to the previous government; what kind of a leader Khrushchev was, etc.—there is no unequivocal evidence available to confirm or disconfirm varying beliefs. (On some of them it is possible, although currently not feasible, to collect such evidence.) Many of the items correlated highly with policy preference concern predictions about the future: “guesstimates” about the likelihood of Russia and China coming to Cuba’s aid in the event of an invasion, the likelihood of personal survival in the event of a nuclear war, etc. Persuasive arguments could be made to change some of these guesstimates, but they are certainly not subject to empirical test. The remaining cognitive items refer to the past, and differences related to policy preferences are found in the interpretations of past events; for instance, who is to blame for the bad relations between Cuba and the United States. Again, the validity of varying interpretations of the past is not subject to any unequivocal test.

The views of the present, the guesstimates about the future, and the interpretations of the past are all related to policy preference, and they also appear to be related to each other in a logically consistent manner.

The picture is a mixed one for those who would desire to change foreign policy attitudes at the elite level. One of the major problems in changing attitudes, that of information relevant to the change reaching those to be influenced, is not as much of a problem at the elite level. However, one would not expect information alone to have a significant effect on the kinds of cognitive

beliefs found to be related to policy preference. One would expect that a consensus among respected sources as to how information was to be interpreted might have an effect. There is some evidence for this in examining differing policy views within each party. It appears that Presidential foreign policy leadership is the most potent factor in unifying the in-party and also in attracting some members of the out-party.

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