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4

Deception, Lying, and Demeanor

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The focus of my research has been on how, when, and why demeanor may betray a lie. I will describe my findings near the end of this chapter. First, I describe a number of theoretical issues that must be considered in examining lies. This includes my definition of lying and how I distinguish lies from secrets, self-deception, and other kinds of deceit. I will then discuss some of the difficulties in using that definition, when people believe what is false to be true. Next I will consider the different motives that underlie the decision to tell a lie. Then I will discuss two principal reasons why lies fail. Then I will review some of our most recent research on how difficult it is to judge whether someone is lying or telling the truth. Finally, I describe some of my thinking about what happens when people believe the government is lying to them, using the Soviet Union as an example.

Lying and Self-Deception

I use the intent of the liar as one of the two criteria for distinguishing lies from other kinds of deception. The liar *deliberately* chooses to mislead the target. Liars may actually tell the truth, but that is not their intent. And truthful people may provide false information—bad advice from an investment counselor—but that is not their intent. The liar has choice; the liar could choose not to lie. Presumably, a pathological liar is compelled to lie and by my definition therefore is not a liar.

My second criterion for distinguishing lies from other deceptions is that the target is not notified about the liar's intention to mislead. A magician is not a liar by this criterion, but Uri Geller is a liar since he claimed his tricks were not magic. An actor is not a liar but an impostor is. Sometimes notification of an intention to mislead is implicit in the framing, to use Goffman's (1974) term, of the situation. Let the buyer beware is one example of an explicit warning that products or services may not be what they are presented to be. (Of course, that warning does not appear in advertisements, nearly all of which are designed to convey the opposite message.) In real estate transactions, the potential buyer is implicitly notified that the seller's asking price is not the actual price the seller would accept. Various forms of politeness are other instances in which the nature of the situation notifies the target that the truth may not be spoken. It would not be proper for the host to scrutinize the dinner guest to determine if the guest's claim to have enjoyed the evening is true, any more than the aunt should worry whether the nephew is lying when he says that he appreciated being given a tie for Christmas. Deception is expected; even if the target might suspect that the truth is not being told, it is improper to question it. Poker is still another situation in which the rules of the game sanction and notify the players that deception will occur, and therefore one cannot consider bluffing to be a lie. In some situations only certain types of deception are allowable. The poker player cannot use marked cards, nor can the home seller conceal a known defect.

In some situations, the issue of whether people will deceive or be truthful is ambiguous. Courtship is probably such a case. The saying "All's fair in love and war" would seem to warn lovers not to believe all they are told. Recent public opinion polls suggest that lies that diminish the number of previous sexual partners one has had are common among college-age adults. Yet I expect that lovers want to believe in the truthfulness of their lover and popular songs testify to the betrayal felt when lies are discovered. Poets have brilliantly explained how romance may be considered a form of collusion to develop and maintain myths about each other.

I differ from Bok (1982), who only considers false statements to be lies. I (Ekman, 1985) argued that concealment is just as much a lie as falsification, if there is an expectation that concealment will not occur. My daughter knows that if she gets into trouble at school and the head teacher gives her a "slip," a formal warning that she may be suspended if the offense is repeated, she must tell me about it. If she does not inform me, she is lying. I do not need to ask her each evening, "Did you get into trouble at school?" She is obligated to reveal that information, and to conceal it is to deliberately mislead me without giving notification.

Marriages differ regarding the obligation to report without being asked if an extramarital affair has begun. If there is an explicit agreement to that effect, then I consider the failure to volunteer such information to be a lie. If there is no such agreement, then such a concealment should not be designated a lie. Commonly, partners differ about their expectations, or at least about their memory of their mutual obligations regarding the reporting of such liaisons.

Suppose the president had a minor stroke during the middle of his term of office, and the doctors concealed that fact. They would have committed a concealment lie since the American public expects to be told about a change in the president's health that affects his ability to do his job. Concealment and falsification are two different techniques for accomplishing the same objective. There are many reasons why liars will always prefer concealment to falsification if the situation allows it: the liar does not need to remember the false story; if caught, the liar can always claim she was just about to reveal the truth or didn't because she was certain the target knew what was going on.

Concealment and falsification are not the only techniques of lying, although they are the most common. I (Ekman, 1985) distinguished three other techniques. Telling the truth falsely occurs when the liar speaks the truth in such a way as to seem to mean the opposite of what is said. Consider the situation in which a wife asks her husband whether he met any attractive women on his business trip and he replies, "I sure did, I slept with a different one every night, and sometimes another one during the lunch break." If that was indeed the case, then the philandering husband would be telling the truth, but in a manner that implies he was faithful. Another technique is to tell a half-truth as if it were a whole truth. The wife who is asked by her husband if she is attracted to the next-door neighbor is telling a half-truth if she replies "he's nice" if she indeed is having an affair. What she has said is true, but she is deliberately leaving out the crucial information to mislead her husband. The incorrect inference dodge was identified by a newspaper columnist who recommended it as the solution to the problem of not wanting to be truthful to a friend who puts you on the spot. Suppose your friend has an exhibition of her paintings, and you think her work is terrible. The incorrect inference dodge would be to reply to her question about whether you like the paintings by saying "Incredible. I can't believe it. How did you do that!"

Bok (1982) defines intentional concealment as secrecy. I think that confuses matters, for notification is the issue in distinguishing secrecy from concealment lies. I reserve the term *secrecy* for a situation in which notification is given about the intention not to reveal information. By calling something a secret, we state our right not to reveal, to maintain privacy. Secrets may remain within one individual, or two or more people may maintain information they consider secret from others. To return to earlier examples, if my daughter has not told me about the trouble in school, that is not a secret; it is a concealment lie. When I ask her if she has a boyfriend, she may properly tell me "that's a secret." If she does indeed have a boyfriend, then she has concealed that from me, but because it is acknowledged, it is termed a secret. Suppose I have not asked her about this, but she knows of my interest from past conversations. If she does have a boyfriend but does not tell me, she is engaging in concealment, but it is not a secret because she has not acknowledged her right to conceal the truth, and it is not a lie because she has not agreed that there is an obligation to inform.

Lane and Wegner (1995), like Bok, do not distinguish secrets from other forms of concealment. They do provide a useful distinction between all forms of con-

cealment and nonconcealment lies. In concealment, the truth is not presented, while in more typical lies—what I have termed falsifications—an untruth is presented as the truth. Their research has quite a different focus from my own, showing how what is concealed can turn into an obsession, requiring ever-increasing efforts to suppress. By my reasoning that would not occur for what I define as secrets, only for concealments in which the act of concealing is not revealed to those excluded from knowing the information.

A broken promise is not a lie. A week before President Bill Clinton took office, a reporter charged that he had broken his campaign promise about Haitian immigration since he was now adopting the position of former president George Bush, a policy he had criticized during the election campaign. With a trace of anger, Clinton defended himself, saying that the American people would think he was foolish if he did not change his policies when circumstances change. From my framework, Clinton was lying only if he had known at the time he criticized Bush that he intended to follow the same policy himself. Consider the charge that when President Bush raised taxes near the end of his term of office it showed he had lied when he said during the campaign “no new taxes.” He could only be branded a liar if it could be proved he knew when he made the promise that he intended to break it.

The failure to remember is not a lie, although liars will often try to excuse their lies, once discovered, by claiming a memory failure. It is not uncommon to forget actions that one regrets, but if the forgetting truly has occurred, we should not consider that a lie, for there was no choice involved. Often it will not be possible to determine whether a memory failure has occurred or whether its invocation is itself a lie.

If someone provides a false account of what truly occurred, that does not necessarily mean the person intended to mislead, and as I explained earlier, if there is not a deliberate intent to mislead, a false statement should not be considered a lie. Why should it matter what we call a false statement? It is not simply a matter of semantics or definition. If the person is not lying, if the person does not believe he is engaged in deception at the moment he is doing it, then I expect his demeanor will be that of a truthful person. There should be no behavioral clues that the account is untrue if the person giving the account does not believe he is lying at the moment he gives the account. While I have no direct evidence for this prediction, it is consistent with my (Ekman, 1985) general theory of when demeanor will betray a lie, and other evidence (Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988; Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991) does support that account. There are a number of ways in which people may provide false information that they believe to be true.

People do misinterpret events, especially the meaning of other people’s actions and the motives that lead people to act one way or another. The fact that someone interprets matters in a way that reflects well upon her, a way that allows her to engage in actions she finds desirable, does not mean that she is necessarily lying rather than misinterpreting. I would not consider such an occurrence necessarily an instance of self-deception. Not every misunderstanding or mis-

interpretation is self-deception. Self-deception presumably occurs when the deceiver does not realize he is misleading himself and does not know his own motive for deceiving himself. It is a subtle matter to distinguish self-deception from rationalization—an attempt to excuse bad judgment or repression.

Consider an alleged rapist who claims that his victim wanted to have sex with him. Even though rapists who do know they had totally unwilling victims often make this claim, lying to avoid punishment, the claim itself does not tell us that it is false. Even if it is improbable, it conceivably might be true. Suppose it was a date rape, and the victim was shy or very fearful, protested only once, and not very strongly, and then did not resist. A rapist could misinterpret the initial protest and construe the subsequent lack of protest and passivity as consent. Would that rapist be a victim of self-deceit? Not, I believe, unless it was certain that he had no awareness that his misinterpretation of his victim's behavior was motivated by a wish to gratify his own needs. Did a rape occur? I believe the answer must be yes, although the rapist may not think it did and may be telling his truth when he claims his victim implicitly consented. And one of the reasons why someone who makes such a claim might appear believable in his demeanor is that he believes his claim and does not believe he is lying. (See Cross and Saxe [1992] for a discussion of this problem in the context of their critique of the use of polygraph testing in child sexual abuse cases.)

Of course, that is not the only reason someone may appear totally believable. I initially (Ekman, 1985) used the phrase *natural liar* to designate those people whose lies are seamless, whose demeanor is totally believable when they know they are lying. I have since (Ekman, 1992) changed the phrase to *natural performer*, since my studies suggest that they are not psychopaths or necessarily antisocial. Natural performers have the capacity to become the role they are playing, to nearly instantly believe for a time whatever they are saying, and because they believe they are saying the truth, their demeanor is totally credible.

Misinterpreting is not the only route by which someone may believe his false account is true. A person may initially know he is lying, but over time he may come to believe in his lie. If that happens, once he has come to believe his lie is a faithful account of what transpired, he may appear truthful. Consider a child molester who, when first accused, claimed that he was only cuddling the child, doing nothing that was really wrong, nothing the child did not want and enjoy. Even though he initially knew he was lying in his account, over time, with many repetitions of his lie, a molester could, I feel, come to believe his false story is true. It is conceivable that he could maintain in consciousness both the memory of the true event—that he forcibly abused the child—and the constructed belief that he only cuddled a willing child. Or the true memory might over time become much less accessible than the constructed belief, or perhaps not accessible at all.

Consider a child who deliberately lies, alleging that a teacher molested her, knowing that never occurred. Suppose the lying child was motivated by a wish to punish the teacher for having humiliated the child in class for not having done well on a test. If the child felt entitled to her revenge, she might reason that this

was the kind of teacher who might have molested her, probably wanted to molest her, probably had molested other children, and so on. I believe we cannot rule out the possibility that over time, with many repetitions and elaborations, the child could come to believe she had been molested.

These examples are troublesome because we do not know how often they may occur. Nor do we know if children are more vulnerable than adults to believing what is false is true, nor do we know whether there are specific personality characteristics associated with this phenomenon. We have no certain way as yet to determine whether a memory is true, partially or totally constructed. We do have ways, which I will describe later, to distinguish a false account, but only when the person giving that account knows he is giving a false account.

Motives for Lying

My interviews with children (Ekman, 1989) and my data on adults from questionnaires suggest nine different motives for lying:

1. To avoid being punished. This is the most frequently mentioned motive by either children or adults. The punishment may be for a misdeed or for an accidental mistake.
2. To obtain a reward not otherwise readily obtainable. This is the second most commonly mentioned motive, by both children and adults.
3. To protect another person from being punished.
4. To protect oneself from the threat of physical harm. This is different from being punished, for the threat of harm is not for a misdeed. An example would be a child who is home alone telling a stranger at the door that his father is asleep and to come back later.
5. To win the admiration of others.
6. To get out of an awkward social situation. Examples are claiming to have a baby-sitter problem to get out of a dull party or ending a telephone conversation by saying someone is at the door.
7. To avoid embarrassment. The child who claims the wet seat resulted from water spilling, not wetting her pants, is an example if the child did not fear punishment, only embarrassment.
8. To maintain privacy without giving notification of the intention to maintain some information as private.
9. To exercise power over others by controlling the information the target has.

I am not certain that every lie would necessarily fit under one of these nine motives, but these are the motives that emerged from the interview data I collected. There are a variety of trivial deceptions—lies of politeness and tact—that are not easily subsumed by these nine motives. By my definition these are not lies because the rules of politeness imply notification. A more difficult case is the lie required to maintain a surprise birthday party. Perhaps it should fit under the privacy motive.

Why Lies Fail

Many lies succeed. It is incumbent upon those interested in detecting lies to account for when lies will fail and when they will succeed. Such an account will not only tell us when behavioral clues may betray a lie, and what we should therefore attend to, but also provide guidelines for deciding which types of experimental deceptive scenarios can provide information relevant to particular real-life settings.

Certainly, it is not the arena that determines the success or failure of a lie. It is not that all spousal lies succeed and all political lies fail. Within every arena of life (and when one begins to consider the matter, there are few arenas in which deception does not occur), some lies fail and others succeed.

Lies fail for a variety of reasons that will not concern us here. For example, many lies are betrayed by someone in whom the liar had confided. Liars may also be betrayed by many other kinds of evidence that expose the liar's claims as false. My focus is not upon these types of betrayal but upon instances in which the liar's own behavior betrays the lie. I omit from such considerations instances in which the liar confesses (although much of my discussion is relevant to predicting when a liar will confess) and instances in which the liar might be judged to have acted in a way so that he or she would be caught. Instead, I am interested in those cases in which some aspect of the liar's behavior, despite his or her best intentions, betrays the liar's false pretense.

To put it briefly, before expanding upon this, there are two reasons why lies fail: one involves thinking and the other involves feeling. Lies fail either because the liar failed to adequately prepare or because of the interference of emotions.

I would predict that, in general (disregarding the type of lie, who is the liar, and who is the target and recognizing that disregarding these issues to make a general assertion is a very risky stance to take), most lies fail because the liar has not adequately prepared the false line he or she intends to maintain. One obvious, if not very interesting, example is when the liar forgets what he has said on one occasion and thoroughly contradicts himself on another occasion. Here, the source of clues to deceit is in the verbal content. One must be cautious about this, since truthful people will contradict themselves. However, I believe it would be possible, although I have not tried to do so, to specify the type of contradictions that are reliable signs of lying.

Another consequence of the failure to adequately prepare is being caught off guard when asked questions the liar had not anticipated and for which the liar has no ready reply. In such a jam, the liar must think of a credible answer on the spot. When doing so, most people will evidence various behaviors that signify they are thinking about what they are saying as they are talking. Pauses, gaze aversion, speech disfluencies, and speech mannerisms may all increase over what is usual for that person. And the use of the hands to illustrate speech (what Ekman and Friesen [1969b] termed *illustrators*) may increase, while voice intonation may flatten. Bear in mind that these are not signs of lying per se. There

is no behavioral sign of lying itself, I maintain. But when these signs of thinking about a reply occur in contexts in which answers should be known without thought, they can betray the liar.

Lies are also betrayed by signs of emotions. The simplest case is one in which the liar attempts to fabricate convincingly an emotion that is not felt. Few people are good at this, although most of the time people get away with it since rarely does the target of such a lie care whether the emotion displayed is feigned or real. There are what I call "reliable" behavioral signs of emotion—reliable in the sense that few people can voluntarily display them at all or correctly. Narrowing the red margins of the lips in anger is an example of such a reliable sign of anger, typically missing when anger is feigned because most people cannot voluntarily make that movement. There are ways around this for the inventive liar, such as utilizing a Stanislavski-like technique to create the actual emotion, so that its involuntary signs will then appear unbidden.

More typically, lies about emotions do not simply involve fabricating an emotion but concealing an emotion that is actually being experienced. Often concealment goes hand in hand with fabrication, in which the liar uses a feigned emotion to mask signs of the emotion to be concealed. Such concealment attempts may be betrayed in either of two ways. Some sign of the concealed emotion may escape efforts to inhibit or mask it, providing what Ekman and Friesen (1969a) termed *leakage*. What they called a *deception cue*, which does not leak the concealed emotion but betrays the likelihood that a lie is being perpetrated, occurs when only an undecipherable fragment leaks. A deception cue also occurs when the very effort of having to conceal produces alterations in behavior that do not fit the liar's message.

Even when the lie is not about emotions, the liar's feelings about lying can betray the lie. Chief among these feelings about lying are the fear of being caught, guilt about lying, and what I have called *duping delight*—the pleasure and excitement of putting one over. Not all lies will call forth these emotions. Whether they do will depend upon characteristics of the liar, the target of the lie, and the content of the lie. Elsewhere (Ekman 1985) I have described in some detail a lying checklist that facilitates making a prediction about the likelihood that any of these emotions about lying will occur.

To give just a few examples, the fear of being caught is highest when the stakes for being caught—the reward that is lost and especially the punishment for being caught lying—are very high. The fear of being caught will also be greater if the liar has not practiced the lie and has not had the experience of having succeeded before in this very lie with this target. If the target is known to be both suspicious and of extraordinary acumen, the fear of being caught will be greater. Guilt about lying will be highest when the liar shares values with and respects the target, when the target is not collusively aiding the lie and does not benefit from the lie, and when the lie is in no way authorized by any social group or institution. Duping delight is enhanced when others who are allies of the liar observe the liar's actions.

While the arousal of any strong emotion—fear, guilt, or delight—produces changes in behavior that may be detectable and thereby betray the lie if they do not fit the liar's line, each emotion produces some unique behavioral signs. Elsewhere (Ekman, 1985) I have explained in detail how these emotions, and the very process of managing emotions, are manifest in face, body, voice, and paralinguistic behavior. Perhaps here it would be useful to mention that there is no one channel that is the best or most sensitive source for clues to deceit. Every aspect of behavior can provide such clues. And there are hints of individual differences as well, in terms of what behavioral source may be most profitable to scrutinize.

An astute lie catcher will assess the likelihood of any of these emotions, so as to better know what behaviors to be especially alert to. Also, such an exercise will alert the lie catcher as to when the truthful person may appear to be lying. One must not make Othello's error of presuming that a sign of fear is a sign of lying. The truthful person may, under some circumstances, be afraid of being disbelieved, or being thought guilty, or manifesting delight. The crucial issue is to examine the circumstances and evaluate whether or not a truthful or lying person would be experiencing these emotions.

Why Is It So Hard to Discern Truthfulness from Demeanor?

Our behavioral measurements of facial expressions and voice can distinguish when someone is lying, in a high-stakes lie about emotion felt at the moment, for 85 percent of the subjects (Ekman, O'Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer 1991). Most observers, however, who are shown the videotapes and asked to judge who is lying do little better than chance, even members of the criminal justice community, such as FBI, local police, or judges, as well as members of the mental health community (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991).

I believe there are two reasons why most people are such poor judges of lying. The first reason I have no data to support; nevertheless, I believe that few people obtain corrective feedback about the accuracy of their judgments about who is lying and who is truthful. In workshops in which I try to improve the ability to detect deceit, I provide numerous examples of lying, providing such feedback. The second reason why most people do so poorly in judging deceit is that they rely too much upon what people say and ignore the discrepancies between the expressive behaviors and what is said. I have three kinds of evidence consistent with this explanation.

We have consistently (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993) found that those observers who are accurate in identifying facial expressions when they are shown in a fraction of a second are more accurate in judging lying. The second type of evidence is that patients with left hemisphere damage, rendering them more impervious to the content of speech, are more accurate than normal subjects in detecting lying (Ectoff, Ekman, Frank, Torreano, &

Magee, 1992). The third type of evidence comes from a set of studies in which separate groups of observers were shown the face only, the body only, the voice (speech frequencies filtered out), and typescripts of what was said during the lying and truthful interviews. We then correlated our behavioral measurements with the judgments made by the observers who had seen either the full audio-video or the separated channels. The overall finding was that when the subjects were lying, the observers' judgments correlated only with the text measures. Duchenne's smile, leakage smiles, illustrators, and pitch—all of which differentiated the deception from the honest interview—were not correlated with the judgments of the deception interview made by the observers who were exposed to the full audio-video record.

It is not that the other nonverbal and vocal behaviors are not detectable. When we examined the judgments made by observers who only saw the face, we found that Duchenne's smiles were correlated with judgments. Similarly, when we examined the judgments made by observers who saw only the body, illustrators correlated with judgments of those who saw only the body, and changes in pitch were correlated with the judgments made by observers who heard only the speech.

In contrast to the nonverbal measures that were not correlated with the judgments of the audio-video presentation of the deception interview, nearly every measure of the verbal text and many of the vocal measures were correlated with observers' judgments of the audio-visual version of the deception interview. The only text measure not correlated with observers' judgments (the number of I's) and the only vocal measure not correlated with observers' judgments (pitch) were the only text and vocal measures that differentiated the honest from deception interviews.

To sum up these findings, the face, body, voice, and text clues that are most relevant to spotting deceit were ignored. Those behaviors that were least useful for differentiating when someone was lying were most relied upon when the observers responded to the audio-visual presentation of the deception interview. (These findings are reported in detail in Ekman, O'Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer [1991]). This apparent failure of the observers to make use of the behaviors most relevant to detecting deceit fits with my (Ekman, 1985) notion that, in social life, people unwittingly collude in maintaining rather than uncovering deception.

Lies by Government

In 1990 I spent five weeks in Russia as an exchange professor at Leningrad State University, where I had earlier been a Fulbright lecturer in 1979. I found that everything was different and everything was the same. Now conversation was easy, criticism and discussion open, but there was much of the same bureaucracy and many of the same intimidating and unjust officials still in power. People were no longer afraid to talk to an American or to criticize their own

government. "You have come to the right country," I was often told. "This is a country of lies! Seventy years of lies!" Again and again I was told by Russians that they had always known how much their government had lied to them. Yet in my five weeks there, I saw how stunned they were to learn about new lies they had not earlier suspected and the disillusionment many Russians felt because they believed that Gorbachev had lied to them, not revealing the truth about the extent of the Chernobyl disaster.

My long conversations with many different Russians caused me to think anew about the importance of trust in a democratic society. Although I recognize that there are occasions when political leaders must lie (e.g., former president Jimmy Carter's lie that we were not attempting to rescue the hostages at the American embassy in Iran), it is dangerous for governmental leaders to maintain a lie for long or engage in a pattern of widespread lying.

For decades Soviets learned that to achieve anything they had to bend and evade the rules. It became a country in which lying and cheating are normal, where everyone knows the system is corrupt and the rules unfair, and survival requires beating the system. Social institutions cannot work when everyone believes every rule is to be broken or dodged. I am not convinced that any change in government will quickly change such attitudes. No one now believes what anyone in the current government says about anything. Few I met believed Gorbachev, and that was a year before the coup. A nation cannot survive if no one believes what any leader says. This may be what makes people willing, eager perhaps, to give their allegiance to any strong leader whose claims are bold enough, and actions strong enough, to win back trust.

Americans joke about lying politicians—"How can you tell when a politician is lying? When he moves his lips!" My visit to Russia convinced me that, by contrast, Americans still expect their leaders to be truthful even though they suspect they will not always tell the truth. Laws work when most people believe they are fair, when it is a minority, not the majority, who feel it is right to violate any law. In a democracy, government only works if most people believe that most of the time they are told the truth and that there is some claim to fairness and justice.

No important relationship survives if trust is totally lost. If you discover your friend has betrayed you, lied to you repeatedly for his own advantage, that friendship cannot continue. Neither can a marriage be more than a shambles if one spouse learns that the other, not once but many times, has been a deceiver. I doubt any form of government can long survive without using force to oppress its own people if the people believe its leaders always lie.

Trust and truthfulness are not the only requirement. The political structure of the government is crucial. It is hard to establish trust unless people believe they have some control over the policies followed by their government.

It is a mistake to think that the relationship between nations is very similar to the relationship between individuals. The forces at work and the type of social institutions that generate decisions, policies, and actions are vastly different. Even when we consider what happens within a nation—the relationship

between the government and the people—I believe it is misleading to use the concepts that are useful for characterizing the relationship between parent and child, husband and wife, or friends. It is easy to make such a mistake, to personalize the nature of government, because government is often symbolized by some representation of the personality of the leader. In a democracy, however, no leader has unchecked power; the network of forces that must be considered is far different from the factors that must be considered to understand the actions of an individual. Even in a dictatorship, the leader's power is not unbridled.

Yet some of the issues involved in lying—that it is not always wrong, that it may destroy trust, that trust may not always be repaired, that most lies eventually are detected—do apply to lies between individuals, lies between government and citizenry, and lies between nations. Some of the lessons we can learn about lying between nations are relevant to understanding lies that occur in friendships and within a family, and vice versa. There is still another reason why trust and lying within the family are relevant to the establishment of a just and decent public climate. Our attitudes about the morality of lying begin within the family, but they extend to all other types of interactions and relationships, even those between a government and its people.

Acknowledgments Much of what I cover has been published in the second edition of my book *Telling Lies*, my book *Why Kids Lie*, and in articles listed in the reference section of this chapter. An exception is new distinctions between concealment lies and secrets I introduce in this chapter. Much of this material also has appeared in *Memory for Everyday and Emotional Events*, edited by N. L. Stein, P. A. Ornstein, B. Tversky, and C. Brainerd (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996). The preparation of this chapter was supported by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH06092).

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